Approved for public release May 5, 2014

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#### TOP-SECRET//COMINT

#### <del>/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR</del>

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FILED WITH THE

	NORTHERN DISTRICT (	OF CALIFORNIA CSO: DATE: 5121
	TASH HEPTING, GREGORY HICKS, CAROLYN JEWEL, and ERIK KNUTZEN, On Behalf of Themselves and All Others	) Case No. C-06-0672-VRW
	Similarly Situated,	CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B.
	Plaintiffs,	ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY
	V.	) AGENCY
- 11	AT&T CORP., AT&T INC., and DOES 1-20, inclusive,	SUBMITTED IN CAMERA, EX PARTE
	Defendants.	) Hon. Vaughn R. Walker )

# IN CAMERA, EX PARTE DECLARATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEITH B. ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

(U) I, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, do hereby state and declare as follows:

### (U) Introduction and Summary

- (U) I am the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), an intelligence agency within the Department of Defense. I am responsible for directing the NSA, overseeing the operations undertaken to carry out its mission and, by specific charge of the President and the Director of National Intelligence, protecting NSA activities and intelligence sources and methods. I have been designated an original TOP SECRET classification authority under Executive Order No. 12958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (1995), as amended on March 25, 2003, and Department of Defense Directive No. 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 159a.12 (2000).
- (U) The purpose of this declaration is to support the assertion of a formal claim of the military and state secrets privilege (hereafter "state secrets privilege") by the Director of

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated: 20041123

Declassify On: MR

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National Intelligence (DNI) as the head of the intelligence community. In this declaration, I also assert a statutory privilege with respect to information about NSA activities. For the reasons described below, the disclosure of the information covered by these privilege assertions would cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States. The statements made herein are based on my personal knowledge of NSA activities and operations, and on information available to me as Director of the NSA.

3. (TS//S: //TSP//OC/NF) This lawsuit implicates several highly classified and critically important NSA intelligence activities and, in particular,

Plaintiffs, in fact, have put at issue activities that have been considered and approved by the FISC, which has authorized NSA to conduct a bulk collection of non-content header/router/addressing information (hereafter referred to as "meta data") related to Internet communications for the vital purpose of uncovering the contacts

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For example, NSA collects bulk meta data related to telephone communications in order to conduct specific and targeted analysis to track

—a highly useful and critical tool like the Internet meta data collection. Also, although Plaintiffs wrongly claim that NSA is collecting and searching, on a massive scale, the content of millions of communications sent or received inside the United States, NSA does collect the content of certain international telephone and Internet communications that involve an agent or member of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization that either originate or terminate outside the United States.

Although the President has acknowledged the existence of that narrowly targeted collection—

—information about this program remains highly classified. The assertion of the state secrets privilege by the Director of National Intelligence and NSA's statutory privilege is essential to protect the national security of the United States. Moreover, in my opinion, because the very subject matter of this lawsuit concerns state secrets, and the risk of their disclosure is so great, this action should be dismissed.

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#### TSP//ORCON/NOFORN (U) Table of Contents 2 /TSP//OC/NF) To facilitate the Court's review, the remainder 3 4 of this declaration is organized as follows: 5 Classification of Declaration Page 6 Page Background 7 Page The National Security Agency A. 8 Page B. September 11, 2001 Intelligence Challenges After September 11, 2001 Page C. 10 Summary of NSA Activities Critical to Meeting Post-9/11 D. 11 Page Intelligence Challenges 12 State Secrets Privilege Page 13 NSA Statutory Privilege Page 14 15 Information Subject to Claims of Privilege Page 16 NSA Sources and Methods at Issue Page 17 Page (1) 18 (2) Page (3) Meta Data Collection and Analysis Page 19 (4) The Terrorist Surveillance Program Page (a) Focus of the TSP on al Qaeda Terrorist Targets 20 Page (b) Importance of the TSP and Mata Data Analysis Page 21 Information Confirming or Denying Intelligence Targets Page 22 23 Harm to National Security from Disclosure Page 24 Risk of Allowing Litigation to Proceed Page 25 Summary and Conclusion Page 26 27 28 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR,

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#### (U) Classification of Declaration

5. (S) This declaration is classified TOP SECRET//COMINT

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12958, as amended by Executive Order No. 13292. Under Executive Order No. 12958, information is classified "TOP SECRET" if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States; "SECRET" if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to national security; and "CONFIDENTIAL" if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to national security. At the beginning of each paragraph of this declaration, the letter or letters in parentheses designate(s) the degree of classification of the information the paragraph contains. When used for this purpose, the letters "U," "C," "S," and "TS" indicate respectively that the information is either UNCLASSIFIED, or is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET.<sup>2</sup>

6. (S) Additionally, this declaration also contains Sensitive Compartmented

Information (SCI), which is "information that not only is classified for national security reasons as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, but also is subject to special access and handling

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TOP SECRET//COMINT //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR requirements because it involves or derives from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and 1 methods." 28 C.F.R. § 17.18(a). Because of the exceptional sensitivity and vulnerability of such 2 3 information, these safeguards and access requirements exceed the access standards that are 4 normally required for information of the same classification level. Specifically, this declaration 5 references communications intelligence (COMINT), also referred to as special intelligence (SI), 6 which is a subcategory of SCI. COMINT or SI identifies SCI that was derived from exploiting 7 cryptographic systems or other protected sources by applying methods or techniques, or from 8 9 intercepted foreign communications. 10 (TS//SI //TSP//OC/NF) This declaration also contains information H related to or derived from the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a controlled access signals 12 intelligence program authorized by the President in response to the attacks of September 11, 13 2001. Although the President publicly acknowledged the existence of the TSP in December 14 15 2005, details about the program remain highly classified and strictly compartmented. 16 Information pertaining to this program is denoted with the special marking "TSP" and requires 17 more restrictive handling. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 3 (U) 28 CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CASE NO. C-06-0672-VRW TOP SECRET//COMINT. TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR

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8. (S) In addition to the fact that classified information contained herein may not be revealed to any person without authorization pursuant to Executive Order 12958, as amended, this declaration contains information that may not be released to foreign governments, foreign nationals, or non-U.S. citizens without permission of the originator and in accordance with DNI policy. This information is labeled "NOFORN." The "ORCON" designator means that the originator of the information controls to whom it is released. Finally, this document is marked Manual Review ("MR") indicating that it is not subject to automatic declassification at any specific date.

#### (U) Background

#### A. (U) The National Security Agency

- 9. (U) The NSA was established by Presidential Directive in 1952 as a separately organized agency within the Department of Defense. Under Executive Order 12333, § 1.12(b), as amended, NSA's cryptologic mission includes three functions: (1) to collect, process, and disseminate signals intelligence (SIGINT) information, of which COMINT is a significant subset, for (a) national foreign intelligence purposes, (b) counterintelligence purposes, and (c) the support of military operations; (2) to conduct information security activities; and (3) to conduct operations security training for the U.S. Government.
- 10. (TS//SI) Signals intelligence (SIGINT) consists of three subcategories:

  (1) communications intelligence (COMINT); (2) electronic intelligence (ELINT); and (3) foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). Communications intelligence (COMINT) is defined as "all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients." 18

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U.S.C. § 798. COMINT includes information derived from the interception of foreign and international communications, such as voice, facsimile, and computer-to-computer information conveyed via a number of means

Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is technical intelligence information derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations except atomic detonation or radioactive sources—in essence, radar systems affiliated with military weapons platforms (e.g., anti-ship) and civilian systems (e.g., shipboard and air traffic control radars). Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT) is derived from non-U.S. aerospace surfaces and subsurface systems which may have either military or civilian applications.

- 11. (S) NSA's SIGINT responsibilities include establishing and operating an effective unified organization to conduct SIGINT activities set forth in Executive Order No. 12333, § 1.12(b), as amended. In performing its SIGINT mission, NSA has developed a sophisticated worldwide SIGINT collection network that acquires, among other things, foreign and international electronic communications and related information. The technological infrastructure that supports NSA's foreign intelligence information collection network has taken years to develop at a cost of billions of dollars and untold human effort. It relies on sophisticated collection and processing technology.
- 12. (S) There are two primary reasons for gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence information. The first, and most important, is to gain as much information as possible in order to allow the United States to counter threats to the nation's security. The second reason is to obtain information critical to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Foreign intelligence information provided by NSA is thus relevant to a wide range of important issues, including (but not limited to) military order of battle; threat warnings and readiness; arms

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proliferation; international terrorism; and foreign aspects of international narcotics trafficking.

13. (S)-NSA's ability to produce foreign intelligence information depends on its access to foreign and international electronic communications. Foreign intelligence produced by COMINT activities is an extremely important part of the overall foreign intelligence information available to the United States and is often unobtainable by other means. Public disclosure of either the capability to collect specific communications or the substance of the information derived from such collection itself can easily alert targets to the vulnerability of their communications. Disclosure of even a single communication holds the potential of revealing intelligence collection techniques that are applied against targets around the world. Once alerted, targets can frustrate COMINT collection by using different or new encryption techniques, by disseminating disinformation, or by utilizing a different communications link. Such evasion techniques may inhibit access to the target's communications and therefore deny the United States access to information crucial to the defense of the United States both at home and abroad. COMINT is provided special statutory protection under 18 U.S.C. § 798, which makes it a crime to knowingly disclose to an unauthorized person classified information "concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government."

#### B. (U) September 11, 2001

14. (U) On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network launched a set of coordinated attacks along the East Coast of the United States. Four commercial jetliners, each carefully selected to be fully loaded with fuel for a transcontinental flight, were hijacked by al Qaeda operatives. Those operatives targeted the Nation's financial center in New York with two of the jetliners, which they deliberately flew into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center.

Al Qaeda targeted the headquarters of the Nation's Armed Forces, the Pentagon, with the third

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jetliner. Al Qaeda operatives were apparently headed toward Washington, D.C. with the fourth jetliner when passengers struggled with the hijackers and the plane crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The intended target of this fourth jetliner was most evidently the White House or the Capitol, strongly suggesting that al Qaeda's intended mission was to strike a decapitation blow to the Government of the United States—to kill the President, the Vice President, or Members of Congress. The attacks of September 11 resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths—the highest single-day death toll from hostile foreign attacks in the Nation's history. In addition, these attacks shut down air travel in the United States, disrupted the Nation's financial markets and government operations, and caused billions of dollars of damage to the economy.

reason of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States."

Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (Sept. 14, 2001). The United States also launched a massive military response, both at home and abroad. In the United States, combat air patrols were immediately established over major metropolitan areas and were maintained 24 hours a day until April 2002. The United States also immediately began plans for a military response directed at al Qaeda's training grounds and haven in Afghanistan. On September 14, 2001, both Houses of Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" of September 11. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 21(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) ("Cong. Auth."). Congress also expressly acknowledged that the attacks rendered it "necessary and appropriate" for the United States to exercise its right "to protect United States citizens both at home and

CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CASE NO. C-06-0672-VRW abroad," and acknowledged in particular that "the President has authority under the Constitution

to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States." Id.

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a state of armed conflict." Military Order, § 1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). Indeed, shortly after the attacks, NATO took the unprecedented step of invoking article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that an "armed attack against one or more of [the parties] shall be considered an attack against them all." North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246; see also Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm ("[I]t has now been determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty...."). The President also determined that al Qaeda terrorists "possess both the capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States

Government," and he concluded that "an extraordinary emergency exists for national defense

C: (U) Intelligence Challenges After September 11, 2001

purposes." Military Order, § 1(c), (g), 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833-34.

17. **(U)** As a result of the unprecedented attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States found itself immediately propelled into a worldwide war against a network of terrorist groups, centered on and affiliated with al Qaeda, that possesses the evolving capability and

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TOP-SECRET//COMINT //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR-intention of inflicting further catastrophic attacks on the United States. That war is continuing today, at home as well as abroad.

18. (U) The war against al Qaeda and its allies is a very different kind of war, against a very different enemy, than any other war or enemy the Nation has previously faced. Al Qaeda and its supporters operate not as a traditional nation-state but as a diffuse, decentralized global network of individuals, cells, and loosely associated, often disparate groups, that act sometimes in concert, sometimes independently, and sometimes in the United States, but always in secret—and their mission is to destroy lives and to disrupt a way of life through terrorist acts. Al Qaeda works in the shadows; secrecy is essential to al Qaeda's success in plotting and executing its terrorist attacks.

#### 19. (TS//SI//NF)


Global telecommunications networks, especially the Internet, have developed in recent years into a loosely interconnected system—a network of networks—that is ideally suited for the secret communications needs of loosely affiliated terrorist cells. Hundreds of Internet service providers, or "ISPs," and other providers of communications services offer a wide variety of global communications options, often free of charge.

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challenges for the Nation's communications intelligence capabilities. First, in this new kind of war, more than in any other we have ever faced, communications intelligence is essential to our ability to identify the enemy and to detect and disrupt its plans for further attacks on the United States. Communications intelligence often is the only means we have to learn the identities of particular individuals who are involved in terrorist activities and the existence of particular terrorist threats. Second, at the same time that communications intelligence is more important than ever, the decentralized, non-hierarchical nature of the enemy and their sophistication in exploiting the agility of modern telecommunications make successful communications intelligence more difficult than ever.

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22. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Another critical tool for meeting the post-9/11 intelligence challenge is the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), which the President authorized specifically to detect and prevent terrorist attacks within the United States by members or agents of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization. Pursuant to the TSP, NSA intercepts the

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TOP SECRET//COMINT //TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR content<sup>5</sup> of telephone or Internet communications for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that (1) such communication originated or terminated outside the United States, and (2) a party to such communication is a member of al Qaeda, a member of a group affiliated with al Qaeda, or an agent of al Qaeda or its affiliates. Recently, in December 2005, and in the wake of media leaks, the President acknowledged the existence of the TSP. Critical details about the TSP, however, have not been disclosed and remain highly classified and strictly compartmented.<sup>6</sup>

information known as "meta data"

The collection of meta data related to Internet communications is conducted pursuant to an Order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court authorizing the use of a pen register and trap and trace device ("FISA Pen Register Order"). See 18 U.S.C. § 3127 (defining "pen register" and "trap and trace device").

Internet communication meta data is header/router/addressing information, such as the "to," "from," "cc," and "bcc" lines, as opposed to the body or "re" lines, of a standard email. Specifically, the FISA Court has authorized NSA to collect, in bulk, meta data associated with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Throughout this declaration, "content" is used to refer to the substance, meaning, or purport of a communication, as opposed to the type of addressing or routing information referred throughout this declaration as "meta data."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> (U) These details, and the harm that would follow from their public disclosure, are explained more fully below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> (TS://SI:/OC/NF) The FISA Pen Register Order was first issued in July 2004 and since then has been reauthorized by the Court approximately every 90 days. Prior to July 2004, the email meta data activities described herein were conducted by NSA pursuant to Presidential authorization issued after September 11, 2001.

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1	electronic communications on the Internet.8
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5	Although the NSA collects
7	email meta data in bulk it is only authorized to query the archived meta data
8	using email addresses for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion
9	that the email address is associated with
10	FISA Court recognized in authorizing the pen register and in finding it consistent with the First
11	and Fourth Amendments, the bulk collection is necessary to allow NSA to use critical and unique
13	analytical capabilities to track the contacts (even retrospectively)
14	known terrorists. Meta data collection/analysis is a highly valuable tool available for protecting
15	the United States from attack, and, accordingly, information pertaining to the email meta data
16	collection activities is highly classified and strictly compartmented.
17	24. (TS//SI //OC/NF) In addition, pursuant to an authorization of the
19	President, NSA is collecting in bulk meta data for telephony communications in the form of
20	billing records that reflect non-content information such as the date, time, and duration of
21	telephone calls, as well as the phone numbers used to place and receive the calls. Although this
22	collection is broad in scope, the NSA does not generally search or analyze the data, but solely
24	8 - <del>(TS//SI//OC//NF)</del>
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28	CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CASE NO. C-06-0672-VRW
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	queries the data with an identified telephone numbers for which there are facts giving rise to a
2	reasonable, articulable suspicion that the number is associated with
3	As with the broad email meta data collection authorized by the FISC, the bulk
4	collection of telephony meta data is necessary to allow the utilization of sophisticated analytical
5	tools for tracking the contacts
7	Historically, only a tiny fraction
8	meta data records collected by NSA has actually been presented to a trained professional for
9	analysis.
10	
11	Like the email meta data collection activities, telephony meta
13	Asks authorities and analysis and the blanch and the bound of the same of the
14	highly classified and strictly compartmented.
15	(U) State Secrets Privilege
16	25. (TS//SI/NF) In the course of my official duties I have been advised of this
18	litigation and have reviewed the allegations in the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Motion
19	for a Preliminary Injunction. As described herein, various classified facts or categories of
20	classified information related to the Plaintiffs' claims are subject to the state secrets privilege
21	assertion in this case by the Director of National Intelligence. The disclosure of this information
23	which relates to NSA intelligence activities, sources and methods, reasonably could be expected
24	to course expensionally every demand to the national service of the Third Club. To addition to
25	is my judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to the subject matter of the litigation that
20	any attempt to proceed in the case will substantially risk the disclosure of the secrets described
. 2	herein and will cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.
21	CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CASE NO. C-06-0672-VRW

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26. (TS//SI/NF) Through this declaration, I also hereby invoke and assert NSA's statutory privilege to protect information related to NSA activities described below. NSA's statutory privilege is set forth in section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959, Public Law No. 86-36 (codified as a note to 50 USC. § 402) ("NSA Act"). Section 6 of the NSA Act provides that "Injothing in this Act or any other law . . . shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency [or] any information with respect to the activities thereof . . . ". By this language Congress expressed its determination that disclosure of any information relating to NSA activities is potentially harmful. Section 6 states unequivocally that, notwithstanding any other law, NSA cannot be compelled to disclose any information with respect to its activities. Further, while in this case the harm would be very serious, NSA is not required to demonstrate specific harm to national security when invoking this statutory privilege, but only to show that the information relates to its activities. To invoke this privilege, NSA must demonstrate only that the information to be protected falls within the scope of section 6. NSA's functions and activities are therefore protected from disclosure regardless of whether or not the information is classified.


# (U) Information Subject to Claims of Privilege

27. (TS//SI //TSP//OC/NF) NSA information related to the Plaintiffs' claims that is subject to the state secrets privilege asserted by the Director of National Intelligence, and to NSA's statutory privilege which I assert herein, includes the following:9


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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> (U) In addition to asserting the state secrets privilege with respect to the NSA information described herein, the Director of National Intelligence, in his accompanying declaration, also asserts the privilege with respect to specific threat information regarding al Qaeda and its affiliates.

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
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
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41. (TS://SI (\*\*OC/NF) Contact-chaining queries also return the meta data that identify the internet protocol ("IP") address from which email accounts have been accessed.

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intercepts the content of millions of communications inside the United States, and seeks to

search the content of those communications by means of key words, is simply wrong. Am.

are also inaccurate. In particular, Plaintiffs' allegation that NSA

Complaint ¶ 39; 43-46.

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In fact, NSA intercepts

the content of an Internet communication under the TSP only if there are reasonable grounds to believe that such communication originated or terminated outside the United States and that a party to such communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. In addition, NSA's bulk collection of email meta data does not collect the content of the communication, and such meta data is collected

Moreover, this email meta data collection and analysis is being undertaken pursuant to an authorization from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and NSA is only authorized to query the archived meta data using email addresses for which there are facts giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the email address is associated with

As set forth further below, the disclosure of these activities would cause

(4) (U) The Terrorist Surveillance Program

exceptionally grave harm to the national security of the United States.

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46. (TS//S)

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Plaintiffs allege in their Amended Complaint that "NSA began

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a classified surveillance program shortly after September 11, 2001 to intercept the

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communications within the United States without judicial warrant." Am. Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs

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cite in particular the President's statements that he authorized "the Program" in 2001 and has

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continued to re-authorize it. Id. ¶ 33. The Amended Complaint also refers to statements made

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by the President and Attorney General concerning the TSP. Id. 99 34-37.

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47. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) While the existence of the TSP is now publicly

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acknowledged, and some facts about the program have been disclosed, sensitive information

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about the nature, scope, operation, and effectiveness of the program remains classified and

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cannot be disclosed without causing exceptionally grave harm to U.S. national security. This

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information demonstrates that the TSP is a foreign intelligence collection program focused on detecting and preventing a foreign terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates, and does

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not involve the interception of content of domestic communications by U.S. persons that are

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unrelated to al Qaeda and its affiliates, and is an operationally swift and effective foreign

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intelligence tool.

(a) (C) Focus of the TSP on al Oaeda Terrorist Targets

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48. (TS://TSP://OC/NF) NSA action to intercept the content of communications

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under the TSP is triggered by a range of foreign intelligence information obtained or derived

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from various sources indicating that a particular phone number or email address is reasonably

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believed by the U.S. Intelligence Community to be associated with a member or agent of al

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Qaeda or associated terrorist organizations. Professional intelligence officers at NSA undertake

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
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TOP SECRET//COMINI <del>/TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR</del> a careful but expeditious analysis of that information to determine whether it would be appropriate to target a telephone number or email address under the TSP. No one piece of information or source is relied upon by NSA to make that decision. Rather, NSA decides based on a range of factors whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that a target for interception is a member of agent of al Qaeda or associated terrorist organizations, including whether the target phone number or email address: (1) is reasonably believed by the U.S. Intelligence Community, based on other authorized collection activities or other law enforcement or intelligence sources, to be used by a member or agent of al Qaeda or associated terrorist organizations; 12 (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) CLASSIFIED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. KEITH B. ALEXANDER; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CASE NO. C-06-0672-VRW TOP SECRET//COMINT /TSP//ORCON/NOFORN//MR



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54. (TS//SI//TSP//OC//NF) Second, NSA minimization procedures also require that NSA refrain from intentionally acquiring the communications of U.S. persons who are not the targets of its surveillance activities, that it destroy upon recognition any communications it acquires inadvertently that are solely between persons in the U.S., and that it refrain from identifying U.S. persons in its reports unless a senior NSA official determines that the recipient of the report requires such information in order to perform a lawful function assigned to it, and the identity of the U.S. person is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or to assess its significance.

# 55. (TS//SI//TSP//ORCON/NF)

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
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
57. (TS//SL//TSP//OC/NF) The TSP provides NSA far greater operational swiftness and effectiveness than under current procedures for obtaining authorization for surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. To the extent individual warrant applications are required for individual targets under current FISA procedures, NSA would be unable to obtain authorization in time to immediately collect operational information sent to and from new phone numbers or Internet accounts, and valuable intelligence would be lost.

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	the TSP program
in conju	nction with meta data collection and analysis, allows NSA to obtain rapidly not only th
content o	of a particular communication, but connections between that target and other possible
targets w	ho may form a web of conspirators. Indeed, because bulk meta data is
archived	NSA may search to determine the prior contacts of
historica	l, as well as forward-looking perspective on potential threats. Where the gravest of
dangers	are at stake—a catastrophic mass casualty terrorist attack against the U.S. Homeland—
	nat NSA obtain as broad a picture of terrorist communications as rapidly as possible in
	identify other targets based on new information. The TSP, in conjunction with meta
	ysis, allows NSA this capability.
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	meta data collection activities have led to the development by NSA of actionable
	nce, much of which could not have been obtained by other means, and much of which
	o important and specific counter-terrorism efforts. Examples include the following:
а	(TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF)
KEITH B. NATIONA	ED DECLARATION OF LT. GEN. ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, L SECURITY AGENCY C-06-0672-VRW
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TOP SECRET//COMINT HTSPHORCON/NOFORNHMR be illustrated by an example of when this tool was not utilized. According to the 9/11 1 Commission report, when Khalid al-Mihdhar, one of the 9/11 hijackers, was in the United States 2 3 from January 2000 to June 2001, he telephoned the home of his wife's family in Yemen. The 4 phone number for this home in Yemen had well-established terrorist connections 14 and was 5 being targeted by NSA through an overseas collection process that did not have the capability to 6 obtain meta-data to help identify the location of incoming calls. At the time, there was no FISA 7 collection on this number, and neither the TSP program, under which NSA targets "one-end" 8 9 foreign calls into the United States, nor collection of bulk meta data that would have allowed -10 analysis of this number to ascertain other contact numbers, were in place. Had the Yemeni 11 phone number been targeted using the TSP and meta data analysis, we should have been able to 12 collect al-Mihdhar's one-end-U.S. calls from the U.S. to Yemen, and their interception would 13 have provided leads for the FBI and CIA to investigate the matter further. Indeed, the 9/11 14 15 Commission report noted that if the FBI had known that al Mihdhar was in the United States, 16 "investigations or interrogation of [al Mihdhar], and investigation of [his] travel and financial 17 activities could have yielded evidence of connections to other participants in the 9/11 plot. The 18 simple fact of [his] detention could have derailed the plan. In any case, the opportunity did not 19 20 arise." Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 21 ("9/11 Commission Report") at 272. While there is an element of hindsight to this example, and 22 perhaps other actions could have detected al Mihdhar, the existence of the TSP one-end 23 collection and meta data analysis would have provided a highly significant tool that may have 24 25

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<sup>(</sup>TS://SI:/NF) In August 1998, the number was found in the pocket of one of the would-be Kenyan Embassy bombers, who had fled the bomb-ladened vehicle at the last minute.

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
ottal connection to meta data collection and analysis, are important to understanding the need for and highly targeted nature of this method for detecting and preventing foreign terrorist threats.

Based on my extensive military career and my role as the Director of the NSA, I believe that the NSA activities discussed herein are among the most important intelligence tools available to the United States for protecting the homeland from another catastrophic terrorist attack. In my view, NSA could not have obtained critical intelligence that has been necessary to protect the Nation in any other way. These NSA activities have given the United States unparalleled ability to understand the interconnected groups and agents that al Qaeda has become. They also have allowed us to identify and track terrorists.

However, while essential to understanding the program, disclosure of this information would reveal sensitive and classified state secrets and, as set forth below, would cause exceptionally grave harm to the national security of the United States.

- B. (C) Information Confirming or Denying Intelligence Targets
- 61. (TS://SI:/TSP://OC/NF) The four Plaintiffs in this case—Tash Hepting, Gregory Hicks, Carolyn Jewel, and Erik Knutzen—have alleged that AT&T has assisted NSA in intercepting their individual communications. Specifically, the named Plaintiffs allege that the content of their telephone and Internet communications and information related to those communications are being intercepted, disclosed, divulged, and/or used without judicial or other lawful authorization. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 32-41; 47; 52; 64; 80-81; 92-93; 101-07; 112-16; 120; 127; 138.

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Disclosure of meta data collection would alert all of our foreign adversaries to these critical intelligence capabilities and thereby severely undermine NSA's ability to gather information concerning terrorist connections.

- (4) (C) Harm of Disclosing Sources and Methods for TSP
- 71. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Disclosure of classified information about the Terrorist Surveillance Program would also reveal to hostile foreign adversaries specific intelligence sources and methods by which NSA conducts this surveillance, thereby providing key insights to foreign adversaries as to whether and how NSA is monitoring communications. Information about the specific foreign intelligence factors that trigger interception under the TSP would obviously reveal to foreign adversaries the very facts that would most likely lead to their communications being intercepted, thereby giving them a roadmap as to how to avoid such interception.

Likewise, disclosure of NSA's methodology of identifying and selecting certain phone numbers or Internet information would readily confirm to our adversaries key information that could be used by those adversaries to avoid interception.

72. (TS//SI//TSP//OC/NF) Similarly, information about the speed and agility with which NSA can collect content on a target, and how long it might maintain surveillance, would provide invaluable insights for an adversary to devise new and different ways to protect their communications. In particular, disclosure of NSA's ability to utilize TSP in conjunction with

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	(U) Risk of	Allowing Litigation to Proceed
76.	( <del>TS//S)</del>	C/NF) Upon examination of the allegations, claims, facts,
and issues r	aised by this case, it is my	judgment that sensitive state secrets are so central to the
subject mat	ter of the litigation that any	attempt to proceed will substantially risk the disclosure of
the privileg	ed state secrets described a	bove.
	In my jud	gment, any effort to probe the outer-bounds of classified
information	would pose inherent and s	ignificant risks of the disclosure of classified information,
77.	(TS//S) //OC	C/NF) Indeed, any effort merely to allude to those facts in
		ling of classified details that should not be disclosed.
		This is a classic
example of	how some limited, non-cla	ssified information, combined with ignorance of the true
facts, can be	e used to speculate about, a	and risk the disclosure of, classified activities
		As noted, even seemingly minor or innocuous
facts, in the	context of this case or other	er non-classified information
		can tend to reveal, particularly to foreign
adversaries	with expertise in the area,	of U.S. intelligence gathering
sources and	methods.	
78.	(TS//S) //O	E/NI)
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(U) Summary and Conclusion

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thwarting further mass casualty attacks by al Qaeda. The United States has already suffered one attack that killed thousands, disrupted the Nation's financial center for days, and successfully struck at the command and control center for the nation's military. Al Qaeda continues to possess the ability and clear, stated intent to carry out a massive attack in the United States that could result in a significant loss of life, as well as have a devastating impact on the U.S. economy. According to the most recent intelligence analysis, attacking the U.S. Homeland remains one of Al Qaeda's top operational priorities, see Declaration of John D. Negroponte, DNI, and al Qaeda will keep trying for high-impact attacks as long as its central command structure is functioning and affiliated groups are capable of furthering its interests.

80. (TS//SI//NF)

One of the greatest challenges the United States confronts in the ongoing effort to prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack against the homeland is the critical need to follow-up on new leads quickly. Time is of the essence in preventing terrorist attacks, and the government faces significant obstacles in finding and tracking agents of al Qaeda as they manipulate modern technology in an attempt to communicate while remaining undetected.

Speed and flexibility are essential in tracking individuals

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To follow the

trails effectively, and to respond to new leads, it is vital for the U.S. Intelligence Community to be able to quickly and efficiently acquire communications to or from individuals reasonably believed to be a member or agent of al Qaeda and associated terrorist organizations. The NSA activities described herein are vital tools in this effort.

81. (TS//SI//NF) For the foregoing reasons, in my judgment the disclosure of the information at issue in this lawsuit would cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States. In addition to upholding the state secrets privilege and statutory privilege assertions by the Director of National Intelligence in this case, I request that the Court also uphold my assertion of NSA's statutory privilege to protect information about NSA activities. Finally, it is my view that continued litigation of this lawsuit, which directly puts at issue highly classified NSA intelligence activities for the detection and targeting of al Qaeda terrorist operations, would risk the disclosure of sensitive classified information and, accordingly, that the Court should not only protect from disclosure the classified information described herein but dismiss this lawsuit.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATE: 12 May 06

LT. GEN. KEITH'B. ALEXANDER

Director, National Security Agency

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