


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29 January 1968  
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
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 28 January 1968. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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SITUATION SUMMARY

SIGINT continues to indicate that the Vietnamese Communists will conduct coordinated attacks in South Vietnam's Military Region (MR) 5 in the immediate future. Latest developments included further references to "N-Day" by Communist units in eastern Quang Nam Province, and additional indications of impending attacks in communications serving PAVN 1st Division military intelligence elements operating in western Kontum Province. To the south, the relocation of the possible Military Intelligence Section of the unidentified possible Front Headquarters in Binh Long Province and the continued passing of urgent precedence messages by the Military Affairs Section of COSVN, highlighted activity in MR's 1 and 10.

In the DMZ area SIGINT has reflected a continued effort by the 27th Independent Battalion to interdict Routes 1 and 9, south of the DMZ. The 7th Company of the 27th Battalion was reportedly ambushed by Allied forces while attempting to destroy a bridge on the night of 25 January.

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I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region 5

Messages passed by Vietnamese Communist military and military intelligence (MI) elements in MR 5 continue to indicate that a coordinated Communist offensive is planned to begin in the immediate future.

The most significant areas of Communist interest appear to be in the western Kontum, Pleiku, eastern Quang Nam-Quang Tin and eastern Binh Dinh Province areas; however, there are indications that coordinated actions in Darlac and Phu Bon Provinces are also planned.

On 27 January, an unidentified authority--last located on 30 December 1967 in southeastern Quang Nam Province near 15-54N 108-12E (BT 014596)--indicated that it was no longer necessary to attack the "Headquarters of the [ARVN] 51st Regiment.... Concentrate on preparing A2 for an N-Day attack, and after that, A1." The use of letter-digit combinations to indicate targets has been observed during recent days in other areas of MR 5, particularly in the western highlands areas where MI messages of 28 January identified targets as "B3" and "B6." On this same date, the probable PAVN B3 Front authority instructed the probable PAVN 1st Division element in western Pleiku to "be resourceful at P4 and P8 and Le Thanh." The overrunning of Le Thanh was mentioned on 16 January as an immediate objective, thus implying that P4 and P8 may be additional targets in the western Pleiku area.

The timing of a coordinated Communist operation, alluded to in several recent messages transmitted by military and MI units in MR 5, was suggested on 26 and 27 January by an element of the 1st Division. The element stated that "from 25 January on, be

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sure to report on the combat positions on the hill(s). Also maintain continuous day and night observation of the ... roads and pay special attention to the Tan Canh (14-39N 107-48E, ZB 0223) area, the airfield, and the road from Tan Canh to Kontum." "You are to send one team back in the direction of the Po Co River to find some crossing points, and then cross over and investigate the enemy position and the bridge at Dien Binh [14-37N 107-48E, ZB 0918]. The others are to...protect and continue to carry out the old assignment. Report your plan for implementation immediately. You are to begin to carry it out no later than 28 January and end it by 2 February."

According to collateral, Tan Canh was involved in an attack by Vietnamese Communist elements on 27 January.

Communications serving the MIS, 1st Division and its four subordinates located in the western Kontum Province-Cambodia area continue to suggest that an attack is imminent in western Kontum.

Messages of 28 January between the MIS and a subordinate located on 26 January near 14-34N 107-47E (YB 996120) indicate that the subordinate is to launch an attack as soon as possible against a target designated as "B3." The attack, scheduled to begin no later than 0030 hours (GOLF) on 30 January, will be followed by the arrival in the target area of another Communist element. The subordinate stated that it was moving the troops in but that its position was exposed and Allied forces were in control of the air and ground. It also indicated that it was close to or crossing a river and that it was moving artillery.

A second MI subordinate was located on 28 January in Kontum Province near 14-47N 107-41E (YB 894361), approximately 34 km northeast of its 14 January location in Cambodia. On 28 January this subordinate asked the MIS whether the troops had crossed the river and requested the MIS to arrange for it to liaise with the reconnaissance element of the division. It further stated that it had conducted its investigation but had not entered the target area yet.

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On 25 and 26 January, a third subordinate--located in the Cambodia-Kontum border area near 14-35N 107-31E (YB 716146) on 27 January--reported that it had engaged Allied forces on 17 January while en route to "E2" to transfer responsibility to "E2." ("E" is a Vietnamese Communist designator for regiment). The subordinate also said that its personnel were weak and that its food and medicine supplies had been depleted.

The fourth MI subordinate was located on 16 January due west of Dak To near 14-41N 107-39E (YB 878250). This subordinate has been in this area since late November, and, through at least mid-January, has reported on an Allied installation referred to as "Worksite 18." According to collateral, "Worksite 18" is probably the Ben Het Fire Support Base near Dak To.

Between 24 and 28 January, the MIS, 1st Division, although still in Laos, moved 7 km toward the Kontum Province border to a position near 14-43N 107-32E (YB 736284).

In other developments, an unidentified radio terminal associated with the PAVN B3 Front moved about 48 km eastward in southwestern Darlac Province to a position near 12-31N 108-00E (AP 741846), 20 km south-southwest of Ban Me Thuot. Previously, this unit had moved southward from the Laos Panhandle into Quang Duc Province between 13 July and 16 December 1967.

In the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border area, the Hq, PAVN 2nd Division--located in southern Quang Nam Province near 15-44N 108-07E (AT 913402) on 28 January--reported on 28 January that it was surrounded and about to move. The Hq, PAVN 3rd Regiment, 2nd Division, moved about 12 km to the east-southeast near 15-40N 108-10E (AT 983329) between 26 and 28 January.

On 29 January the possible Hq, VC 1st Regiment, 2nd Division, located on 17 January near 15-45N 108-11E (AT 993425) in south-eastern Quang Nam, reported that it was engaged in combat and about to move.

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To the south, in central Quang Ngai Province, an unidentified subordinate of the Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control was located near 15-05N 108-38E (BS 455681) on 28 January, 24 km north-northeast of its 24 January location.

(2/O/VCM/R41-68, 290532Z; R40-68, 290038Z; R39-68, 282120Z; R38-68, 281902Z; R37-68, 281615Z; 2/G12/VCM/R265-68, 290605Z; R264-68, 290346Z; R262-68, 282025Z; R259-68, 281525Z; R257-68, 281347Z; R256-68, 281245Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

### Military Region 1

Between 19 and 26 January the possible MIS of the unidentified possible Front Headquarters in Binh Long Province, moved about 30 km southward, from the Binh Long-Cambodia border area near 11-57N 106-07E (XU 599230) to a position in west-central Binh Long at 11-41N 106-27E (XT 574917). Additionally, on 26 January the possible MIS was noted in communications with the Military Intelligence Bureau of COSVN for the first time since mid-December 1967.

Meanwhile, a subordinate of a new MI control authority was located on 25 January in the Binh Duong-Binh Long Province border area near 11-21N 106-31E (XT 649542), approximately 80 km southwest of its 8 November 1967 position and in the same general area as the control authority. This entity is one of a group of at least six subordinates which were previously controlled by the possible MIS of the possible Front Headquarters in Binh Long, but which are now subordinate to--and currently communicate with--the new control authority.

In other activity, in a 26 January message to the MIS, MR 1, a subordinate--located on 27 January in the Long Khanh-Bien Hoa Province border area near 10-52N 107-05E (YT 285035)--stated that "the battalion attacked, killing more than 200 enemy in their fox-holes and setting three M113's on fire." The subordinate indicated that the battalion had been guided by "a person who surrendered."

The MIS also provided the subordinate with forewarning of an Allied operation in two messages of 26 January. The MIS stated

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that the "headquarters of the [ARVN] 18th Division agreed to allow the U.S. 9th [Infantry] Division to initiate an operation in two areas." One of the areas was stated to be along the Suoi Tre Stream (10-54N 107-13E, YT 2406). The MIS further reported that the objectives of the operation were to "destroy our food supplies and transportation routes," and indicated that the sweep operation might possibly last until the end of the New Year's holiday. The subordinate was instructed to take precautions, since the Allied forces might use "commandos" to penetrate the VC positions ("Commandos" is a VC term used to indicate Allied forces consisting of Civilian Irregular Defense Group and U.S., and/or ARVN Special Forces). There have been recent SIGINT indications that this subordinate is associated with and apparently supports elements of the VC 274th Regiment.

(2/G10/VCM/T180-68, 262225Z; T179-68, 261840Z; T173-68, 261437Z)  
~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 1/10

According to preliminary information, the Military Affairs Section (MIS) of COSVN continues to be involved in the exchange of messages of a urgent nature. The possible Hq, MR 10 passed 17 messages of this type to MAS COSVN between 26 and 27 January; additionally, on 27 January, Hq, MR 2 and the possible Hq, VC 5th Light Infantry Division (LID) element in Phuoc Long Province were recipients of 3 and 2 messages, respectively. An extremely high volume of apparently urgent messages has been passed both to and from MAS COSVN since 18 January. Prior to that date, it was unusual to observe more than one such message on a single day.

In other message activity within this area, between 27 and 28 January MAS COSVN passed a high volume of 17 messages to the possible Hq, 5th LID element in Phuoc Long. On 24 January, three messages with instructions to "decrypt immediately" were noted being passed from the possible unidentified Front Headquarters to the possible Hq, MR 10.

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In MR 10, Hq, VC 9th LID was located on 28 January in north-western Phuoc Long Province near 12-00N 106-43E (XU 872260). This move places the headquarters in the same area in which it was last located on 3 December 1967, and within 5 km of the 28 January location of the probable Hq, VC 271st Regiment near 11-59N 106-43E (XU 875249).

(2/G10/VCJ/R028-68, 281610Z; R027-68, 271537Z; R026-68, 261630Z; R025-68, 251720Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

#### Military Region 2

The Alternate Hq, MR 2 continues to pass an unusually high volume of messages to its subordinate through 28 January. During the period 26-28 January, the largest volumes were passed to the tentative My Tho Provincial Unit and the tentative VC 261st Battalion, both of which are located in western Dinh Tuong Province. According to collateral, an Allied Operation in the CORONADO series is currently being conducted in this area.

(2/G10/VCJ/R026-68, 261630Z; R027-68, 271537Z; R028-68, 281610Z; 3/0/STY/R21-68, 242200Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

#### Military Region 4

The radio station serving the Region 4 Committee (RC-4) was located on 27 January along the Cambodian border in western Hau Nghia Province at 10-54N 106-10E (XT 276054), approximately 29 km south of its 17 January location.

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#### 2. DRV Communications

##### DMZ Area

Since as early as 21 January, SIGINT has revealed the use of tactical Communications Operating Instructions (COI) between the possible Hq, PAVN 325C Division and its 95C Regiment. In addition,

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on 26 January, the possible PAVN 101D Regiment and an unidentified radio terminal appeared in communications with the division headquarters utilizing the same signal plan. The use of a simplified version of the normal communications plan has, in the past, been associated with increased tactical activity by the units concerned.

The 27th Independent Battalion continues efforts to interdict Routes 1 and 9 in coordination with unidentified units "Bach Dang" and "CX52." The 7th Company, 27th Battalion, operating in the vicinity of Routes 1 and 9 attempted to destroy an unspecified bridge on the night of 25 January but was prevented from doing so by an Allied ambush. On 27 January the 27th Battalion reported that "Bach Dang" would possibly send down one additional battalion. The meaning of covername "Bach Dang" first noted on 13 January, is unknown. The abbreviation "CX52" (CX is a known cover designator), was first noted on 26 January and possibly refers to the 52nd Regiment, 320th Division. Meanwhile, the 27th Battalion reported on 26 January that the "enemy" was in a high state of confusion, had fled Khe Sanh and that Huong Hoa District (in which Khe Sanh is located) had been liberated. Several recent references in 27th Battalion communications to a "first step" or a "first phase" indicate that the present level of increased tactical activity will probably continue.

Traffic-passing communications serving the new major PAVN headquarters northwest of Khe Sanh have been isolated in SIGINT. Since at least 18 January, this headquarters--last located on 27 January at 16-53N 106-24E (XD 498674)--has been noted in traffic passing communications with three unidentified subordinates. One of the subordinates, located at 16-40N 106-36E (XD 714422) on 28 January, also communicates with the DMZ Front. The two other subordinates were located at 16-31N 106-32E (XD 631276) on 28 January and 16-44N 106-32N (XD 638490) on 26 January. In addition, since at least 25 December 1967, communications have been noted between this new major PAVN headquarters and the PAVN 325C Division. Communications between the 325C Division and the DMZ Front were last observed on 31 December thus reflecting the resubordination of the division to the new major PAVN headquarters. Hq, 325C Division currently maintains communications with High

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
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Command Hanoi; Hq, MR 4 (North Vietnam); the new major PAVN head-  
quarters; the three subordinate regiments of the division--29th,  
95C, 101D, and the 5th Battalion, 95C Regiment. Hq, 325C Division  
was last located on 27 January at 16-44N 106-36E (XD 710410),  
approximately 16 km west-northwest of Khe Sanh.



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Overland Infiltration

Messages passed from the tentative Hq, 71st Transportation Regiments PAVN 559th Transportation Group, to Unit 30 on 17 January, are now known to have been originated by the possible Forward Element One, B3 Front, located in northwestern Pleiku Province near 14-21N 108-10E (AR 951722) on 25 January. This is the first indication of a communications capability between this forward element and the tentative Hq, 71st Regiment.

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
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