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3/O/STY/R05-68
05 January 1968
DIST: O/UT
(SEA SIGSUM 05-68)

SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

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
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3/O/STY/R05-68
05 Jan 68 2056Z
DIST: O/UT

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SOUTHEAST ASIA SIGINT SUMMARY

This report summarizes developments noted throughout Southeast Asia available to NSA at time of publication on 05 January 1967. All information in this report is based entirely on SIGINT except where otherwise specifically indicated.

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SITUATION SUMMARY

In South Vietnam, communications serving Vietnamese Communist units near the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border of Military Region (MR) 5 continue to provide reflections of Allied operations in that area. Unidentified military elements associated with the PAVN 1st Division, PAVN B3 Front discussed difficulties in their offensive preparations and reported on Allied forces in the Dak To area of western Kontum Province. In MR 1 the possible Hq, PAVN 7th Division has relocated in eastern Tay Ninh Province to a position near its tentative forward element. The possible Hq, MR 4 has moved out of its normal base area near the Hau Nghia-Binh Duong-Tay Ninh Province border, and was located by SIGINT on 3 January in north-central Tay Ninh.

In the Khe Sanh area of the DMZ, reconnaissance elements which were previously identified as possibly associated with the 7th Battalion, PAVN 29th Regiment, have been re-identified as reconnaissance

The probable PAVN 320th Division was observed in sporadic communications on 5 January; communications serving deploying elements of the probable 304th Division were unobserved on this date.

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I. COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. MILITARY

1. Vietnamese Communist Communications - South Vietnam

Military Region 5

Reflections of Allied operations continued to be observed in the communications of Vietnamese Communist entities in the Quang Nam-Quang Tin Province border area. On 4 January, the PAVN 2nd Division Forward Element indicated that it was in a difficult situation and under attack; on the previous day, the radio station serving the forward element was located in northern Quang Tin near 15-38N 108-09E (AT 941294), approximately 18 km northwest of Cam Y. During communications with the Hq, MR 5 Main Force Unit Control (MFUC) on 5 January, the Hq, 2nd Division reported that it was engaged in combat and requested close maintenance of communications. The division headquarters was located near 15-36N 108-09E (AT 948273) on 3 January, in the immediate area of its forward element's location on the same day.

Communications of the Hq, 2nd Division and its Forward Element continued sporadically on 4 January. The latest communications of the division headquarters and its forward element with their subordinates occurred at 0703Z and 0136Z, respectively on 4 January.

In the same area, an unidentified subordinate of the Rear Services Headquarters, Quang Nam Province, was located on 4 January in northeastern Quang Nam near 16-04N 108-15E (BT 036760), approximately 26 km northeast of its 27 December location.

On 4 January, the Hq, MR 5 MFUC was located in the vicinity of 15-31N 107-58E (ZC 184175), near its 31 December in north-central Quang Tin Province; this latest location indicates that its previously reported 3 January position was erroneous.

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In Khanh Hoa Province, an unidentified communications terminal associated with the PAVN 5th Division, relocated approximately 15 km to the south between 2 and 4 January, to a position in the northeastern portion of the province near 12-35N 109-05E (BP 915911). The radio station serving this element is now located approximately 10 km north of Ninh Hoa.

On 4 January, the probable Gia Lai Provincial Unit reported to the Hq, MR 5 Provincial Unit Control (PUC) that it was in a difficult situation. The probable provincial unit was located on 30 December 1967 in northeastern Pleiku Province near 14-11N 108-10E (AR 951690).

In the western highlands, a tentatively identified artillery unit associated with the PAVN B3 Front was located in Laos on 4 January, near the Cambodia-South Vietnam-Laos border, at 14-42N 107-31E (YB 720260). This unit is now located approximately 25 km north-northeast of its 2 January position in Cambodia.

In possibly related activity, messages of 3 and 4 January exchanged between unidentified military elements associated with the PAVN 1st Division, B3 Front discussed difficulties in Vietnamese Communist offensive preparations and reported on Allied forces located southwest of Dak To. On 3 January the subordinate of the two elements--referred to as C2 (unidentified)--estimated that it would be able to open fire on 5 January. The subordinate also stated that its rice supply was gone and that it would send personnel to obtain rice on 8 January. The message further reported that Allied forces had airlifted three artillery pieces to Hill 823 (14-37N 107-38E, YB 852188). On the same day, the control authority told the subordinate that, "according to the division's order,...you are to estimate the number of personnel needed for the offensive and send the rest back to carry rice." On 4 January the subordinate reported that frequent "commando" activity had hindered preparations and requested permission to use one of its guns to shell the commandoes as a means of self-defense.

The control authority was located on 4 January near 14-41N 107-31E (YB 710245) in the vicinity of the unidentified artillery unit located in Laos.

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A captured message dated 4 November from the VC 2nd Regiment, FAVN 3rd Division to Hq, MR 5 itemized the problems facing the unit. In the message it was stated that the regiment had encountered personnel and equipment losses in addition to supply and morale problems while it was operating in Quang Ngai Province and during its September-October move to Binh Dinh Province.

The message reported that "unavoidable losses" from B-52 raids and artillery attacks had adversely affected the troops' morale. An increase in "destructive fire," "commando" landings and spy activities had caused much concern. According to the message, the regiment had managed to conduct attacks on the battalion level but had been unable to launch a concentrated regimental attack.

The document discussed the problem of establishing a rear area and of providing a daily flow of rice. At times the troops had to do without meals and eat gruel, due either to a lack of rice or money to buy it. The message cited a shortage of medicine and an increase in the number of wounded and sick: "The incidence of malaria and dysentery had climbed to 20-25 percent per company and there is no medicine. The regiment's dispensary has been bombed destroying the equipment and material."

(2/G12/VCM/R0035-68, 040028Z; R0040-68, 040820Z; R0046-68, 042040Z; R0044-68, 041751Z; 3/0/STY/R04-68, 042100Z; 2/G12/VCM/R0049-042301Z; R0050-68, 050102Z; R0047-68, 042013Z; R0043-68, 041559Z; T042-68, 040855Z; T028-68, 031407Z; 2/0/VCM/T02-68, ~~HELIX~~)

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Military Region 1

The possible Hq, FAVN 7th Division appears to have relocated into eastern Tay Ninh Province. Preliminary information indicates that on 2 January the division headquarters was located in eastern Tay Ninh near 11-34N 106-18E (XT 416730), approximately 19 km southwest of its 19 December position. The tentative Hq, 7th Division Forward Element was also located on 2 January at 11-34N 106-19E (XT 431781) in the immediate area of the possible division headquarters. The forward element maintains daily communications with the suspected FAVN 165th Regiment; however,

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communications between the forward element and the tentative PAVN 141st and 101st Regiments have not been noted since 6 October and 30 December 1967, respectively. An increase in Allied troop strength in the Bau Co (11-28N 106-11E, XT 2867) area of Tay Ninh was reported on 3 January by a subordinate to the Military Intelligence Bureau of COSVN. The subordinate stated that "the infantry has been reinforced by one battalion" and that there were many more "enemy troops" at Bau Co. Allied troops were reported to be stationed from Highway 1 to Highway 5 to the west of Bau Co, and up to Highway 4. This subordinate was located on 1 January about 6 km northeast of Bau Co at 11-30N 106-14E (XT 333705).

On 4 January, the Military Intelligence (MI) element possibly serving the Hq, VC 46th Sapper-Reconnaissance Battalion was located in northeastern Tay Ninh near 11-31N 106-24E (XT 528739) approximately 10 km southeast of its 28 December location.

(2/G10/VCM/R005-68, 041401Z; T024-68, 031530Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 2

On 4 January, Alternate Hq, MR 2 attempted to contact the tentative Hq, MR 2 for the first time since 26 November. During late November, SIGINT had reflected the eastward move of Alternate Hq, MR 2 across the Mekong River to a position near or with the tentative region headquarters. The proximity of these two Mr 2 headquarters may have precluded the need for establishing radio contact with each other at that time.

(3/O/STY/R238-67; 2/G10/VCJ/R004-68, 041435Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

Military Region 4

The possible Hq, MR 4 was located on 3 January in north-central Tay Ninh near 11-31N 106-15E (XT 361733), about 20 km northwest of its normal area of operation near the Hau Nghia-Binh Duong-Tay Ninh tri-border area. The possible MR 4 headquarters was last firmly located in its usual base area on 19 November. Previous tentative information has suggested this that entity may have relocated into the north-central Tay Ninh area early as 18 December.

(2/G10/VCJ/R004-68, 041435Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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Military Region 6

On 4 January the Region 6 Committee (RC-6) was located in eastern Binh Tuy Province at 11-17N 108-00E (AN 729489), approximately 11 km south-east of its 18 December 1967 location on the Lam Dong-Binh Tuy Province border.

2. DRV Communications

DMZ Area

Reconnaissance elements which have been noted in the Khe Sanh area since 27 December and which have previously been identified as possibly associated with the 7th Battalion, PAVN 29th Regiment, have been reidentified as reconnaissance units possibly associated with PAVN 325C Division elements. Communications between an Intelligence Section (designated Section 2 and probably using the cover designator "Song Ma") of an unidentified echelon, and subordinate reconnaissance teams (probably using the cover designators "Song Hong" and "Song Thao"), have reflected extensive reconnaissance on positions north of Khe Sanh.

A 4 January message from one of the reconnaissance elements stated: "Have completed the survey of the stipulated military terrain features and coordinated with Song Lam in looking for a route to enter Ta Tuc (16-39N 106-41E, XD 802421)." The cover designator "Song Lam" has been previously observed in association with the possible PAVN 101D Regiment.

SIGINT indicates that the reconnaissance elements currently active in the Khe Sanh area are the same elements which performed reconnaissance near Con Thien in August and September 1967; at that time, these elements were noted in association with the possible PAVN 101D and 812th Regiments and the 164th Artillery Regiment.

Tactical communications between a 9th Battalion, possibly of the PAVN 29th Regiment, were observed on 1 and 4 January. The battalion's area of operation has not yet been determined.

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In view of the above noted reidentification, the presence of the 7th Battalion, 29th Regiment in the Khe Sanh area cannot be confirmed in SIGINT.

The 3rd Company, 3rd Battalion, PAVN 803rd Regiment has been ordered to withdraw from its area of operations in the coastal region of the southern DMZ. In a 4 January message the company was informed that it would no longer be committed to a combat role and was ordered to return to Vinh Chap (17-06N 106-58E, YD 100908) for training.

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PAVN High Command/304th-320th Infantry Division

Communications serving the probable PAVN 320th Division continued sporadically on 5 January. On this date, station ECHO was observed passing messages originated by a suspect infantry regiment of the probable 320th Division. This regiment, which was located in the general area of station ECHO on 27 December, has apparently remained in that area (16-28N 106-49E, XD 946220). Also on 5 January, Hq, probable 320th Division was observed in message activity with an unidentified subordinate associated with this division.

Additional SIGINT has revealed that the communications link between Hq, probable 320th Division and the unidentified entity suspected to be associated with Hq, MR 5 was active as early as 12 December. This link has been unobserved since 31 December.

Communications serving the deploying elements of the probable PAVN 304th Division were not observed on 5 January.

(3/O/STY/R03-68; 3/O/STY/R04-68) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

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Rear Services

Bomb damage to five vehicles was revealed in a 25 December message from an unidentified and unlocated PAVN Rear Services element. Two vehicles from D21 were damaged at Kilometer 102 (unlocated) and three vehicles--one from D51, one from D21 and one from D52--were damaged at Kilometer 103 (unlocated). "D" is the usual PAVN designator for "Battalion."

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