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16 FEBRUARY 1968

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424;
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COPY NO. _____

SITUATION IN



SOUTH VIETNAM

AS OF 1200 HOURS EST

16 FEBRUARY 1968

NO. 6

ATTENTION:

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424

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
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WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424;(b)(3) 10.U.S.C 424;3.3(h)(2)

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424



SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(Based on data received in DIA through
1200 EST, 16 February 1968)

SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS OF 1200 HOURS EST, 16 FEBRUARY 1968 No. 6

Introduction

(b)(3) Enemy units are continuing to prepare for action in the eastern DMZ/Quang Tri City area; US Marine tanks engaged three enemy armored vehicles (type unknown) north of Con Thien on 16 February. Khe Sanh Base has been subjected to more harassing fire, and fighting is still in progress in the Hue Citadel. Only small-scale enemy-initiated activity was reported throughout South Vietnam during the past 24 hours; Nha Trang in 2d Corps was hit by mortar fire on the 16th, as were the two airfields at Can Tho in 4th Corps.

1st Corps

(b)(3) Developments in eastern Quang Tri Province continue to be indicative of preparations for major enemy attacks there. On 16 February, US Marine tanks engaged three enemy armored vehicles four nautical miles north of Con Thien. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 elements of the 812th and 803d Regiments of the 324B Division were reconnoitering just east of Quang Tri City. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424; (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424:3.3(h)(2)

(b)(3) they would attack if conditions were right. The movement of these two regiments from their traditional operating areas in the DMZ suggests that a coordinated attack is in the offing.

(b)(3) Enemy units around Khe Sanh are still placing harassing fire on the base and engaging in reconnaissance and resupply activities. (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424 the Communists are also keeping a meticulous record of friendly resupply operations. In this connection, an enemy air defense unit in the Khe Sanh area exchanged a high volume of traffic with Hq, Khe Sanh Area Front, on 11-12 February. This traffic may be indicative of an attempt to disrupt aerial resupply.

(b)(3) US Marines report slow progress against enemy positions in the Hue Citadel; however, they estimate that only "a couple of blocks" remain in enemy hands. Fighting in Hue has reportedly cost the enemy more than 1,330 killed.

2d Corps

(b)(3) An attack on Nha Trang on 16 February involved 14-15 82-mm mortar rounds impacting on the base. The Vietnamese Security Service in Khanh Hoa Province had indicated as early as 7 February that a unit of the NVA 18B Regiment was maneuvering into position on a mountain range west of Nha Trang in order to launch a mortar attack on the airfield.

~~(S)~~ The Viet Cong are reported to have a three-stage plan for seizing control of Vinh Binh Province. The first stage supposedly consisted of the attack on the provincial capital of Tra Vinh City on 31 January and 1 February. The second stage, currently in progress, is aimed at the destruction of outposts and village offices in Chau Thanh District, which surrounds the provincial capital. The goal for the second stage is the isolation of Tra Vinh City. Some success has been achieved since almost all outposts guarding the approaches to the city have been destroyed. The third and final stage will be an attempt to take Tra Vinh City and seize control of the provincial government.

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Page 7 of 8

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