

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY  
IN 46826

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081816Z

CITE [REDACTED]

DIST 3 FEBRUARY 1968

COUNTRY VIETNAM

DOI 1 - 4 FEBRUARY 1968

SUBJECT PRISONER'S VIEWS OF VIET CONG (VC) ACTIVITIES AND  
OBJECTIVES IN SAIGON DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (5 FEBRUARY 1968) FVS-16,578

SOURCE INTERROGATION OF NINE VIET CONG SUSPECTS AT THE  
NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER.

1. BETWEEN 1 FEBRUARY AND 4 FEBRUARY 1968, AT LEAST 13 PERSONS  
WITH VARYING DEGREES OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE RECENT VIET CONG (VC)  
ACTIVITIES IN SAIGON WERE ARRESTED AT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAIGON. AVAILABLE INFORMATION INDICATES  
THAT ONLY TWO OF THE PRISONERS HAD BEEN WORKING FOR THE VC LONGER  
THAN ONE YEAR. ALL PRISONERS ARE LOW-LEVEL, THE MAJORITY CLAIMING  
TO HAVE BEEN RECRUITED IN MID TO LATE 1967 OR, IN ONE CASE, EVEN  
AS LATE AS 31 JANUARY 1968. THE MAJORITY OF THESE PERSONS HAD  
BEEN [REDACTED] (CAPTURED, BUT NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION)

AND [REDACTED] (NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION)

[REDACTED]

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3.5(c)

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

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3.5(c)

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2. THE TWO INDIVIDUALS WITH THE LONGEST VC AFFILIATION WERE

[Redacted]

THESE

TWO PERSONS PROVIDED THE ONLY ANSWERS OF SUBSTANCE TO A SERIES OF QUESTIONS REGARDING VC ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES. THE QUESTIONS AND THEIR ANSWERS FOLLOW:

Q. WHAT WERE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COUNTRYWIDE MILITARY ACTION? 3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) IN DECEMBER 1967 OR EARLY FEBRUARY 1968 (DURING TET), OR THERE WOULD BE A GENERAL ATTACK BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL (ORGANIZED DEMONSTRATIONS) TO DEMAND U.S. WITHDRAWAL AND A "COALITION, PEACE AND NEUTRALIST GOVERNMENT FOR SVC."

[Redacted] THE VC HAD SUFFICIENT FORCES TO ACCOMPLISH THIS.

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3.5(c)

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(classification) (dissem controls)

Q. WHAT FUTURE CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITIES WERE YOU GIVEN BEYOND IMMEDIATE ATTACK ORDERS?

A. [Redacted] THAT AFTER SAIGON WAS LIBERATED THERE WOULD BE A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH [Redacted] WAS TO PARTICIPATE. THE DEMONSTRATION WOULD EVENTUALLY END AT THE SAIGON MARKET WHERE THE DEMONSTRATORS WOULD ORGANIZE A MEETING CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED TROOPS (ESPECIALLY U.S.) FROM SAIGON. IF THE VC FAILED [Redacted] WAS TO RETURN TO [Redacted] AND IF NO CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED [Redacted] WAS TO TRY AGAIN ON 4 FEBRUARY AT ANOTHER LOCATION WHEN [Redacted] WOULD BE GIVEN A NEW ASSIGNMENT. [Redacted] WAS TO REPORT THE RESULTS OF THE DEMONSTRATION BACK TO [Redacted] ON THE BASIS OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS, VC POLITICAL CADRES WOULD FORM A RESOLUTION TO HAND TO THE EXISTING SVN GOVERNMENT. [Redacted] SAID THAT THE VC WOULD TRY TO CREATE THIS GENERAL UPRISING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IN THE HOPE THAT THEY COULD PRESSURE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) INTO ACCEPTING A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

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3.3(h)(2)

Q. WERE YOU TOLD AND DID YOU BELIEVE THAT THE POPULATION WOULD JOIN IN A GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST GVN AND AMERICAN FORCES.

A. [Redacted] REPORTED THAT [Redacted] IN SAIGON) HAD SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD COOPERATE WITH VC FORCES

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(dissem controls)

BY REMAINING SILENT OR INACTIVE, THUS ALLOWING THE VC TO ATTACK THE GVN FORCES THROUGHOUT SAIGON. [ ] BELIEVED THIS AND THOUGHT THAT THE SAIGON POPULATION WOULD RESPOND FAVORABLY TO THE VC UPRISING. [ ] THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE A GREAT DEAL OF SUPPORT FROM THE POPULACE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE WAR HAD LASTED SO LONG AND MANY WAR VICTIMS WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT ANY TYPE OF GOVERNMENT FOR A CESSATION OF THE FIGHTING.

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Q. WHAT ACTUAL SUPPORT DID YOU RECEIVE FROM THE POPULACE?

A. NEITHER [ ] SAW ANY ACTUAL SUPPORT FOR THE VC FROM THE POPULACE.

3.3(h)(2)

Q. WERE YOU LED TO BELIEVE THAT CURRENT MILITARY ACTION WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE NORTH- KHE SANH OR DMZ AREA?

A. [ ] HAD HEARD OF NOTHING SPECIFIC - ONLY ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. [ ] HAD NOT HEARD OF ANY OTHER POSSIBLE UPRISINGS.

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF AN EFFORT TO ORGANIZE THE "ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY" AS A COALITION MOVEMENT TO NEGOTIATE WITH NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV)?

A. [ ] ANSWERED NO.

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Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY PLANS FOR FOLLOW-UP STEPS IN THE CURRENT STRATEGY? IF SO, WHAT?

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
A. [ ] KNEW NOTHING OF ANY FURTHER PLANS. [ ] DID NOT KNOW OF ANY FOLLOW-UP STEPS IN THE CURRENT STRATEGY BECAUSE AT THE TIME THE VC WERE SO SURE THEY WOULD WIN.

3.3(h)(2)

Q. IF THE CURRENT MILITARY ACTIVITY IS NOT DECISIVE, AND IN FACT THE VC APPEAR TO HAVE ACHIEVED LITTLE MILITARILY AS AGAINST PSYCHOLOGICAL RESULTS, HOW DO YOU ANTICIPATE THIS WILL BE EXPLAINED BY THE NFLSV OR HANOI?

A. [ ] HAD NO ANSWER TO THIS SPECIFIC QUESTION. [ ] STATED THAT THE VC WOULD HAVE TO EXPLAIN TO THE PEOPLE IN THEIR AREA THAT THEY HAD DONE THEIR UTMOST AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO WAIT FOR ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY. HANOI WOULD NEVER DISCUSS FAILURES BUT WOULD PRAISE THE ACHIEVEMENTS.

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