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N I C INTERROGATION REPORT

THIS REPORT IS THE RESULT OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED BY THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) AND THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF DETACHMENT 6, 6199TH SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP (USAF).

COUNTRY	: SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)	NIC REPORT NO	: 351/68
SUBJECT	: Opinion of VC Offensive Capabilities in KHANH HOA Province and Indicators of New Offensive	NIC CASE NO	: FET
DATE OF INFO	: Mid 1967 - January 1968	DATE OF REPORT	: 18/3/68
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Source did not feel there would be any new offensive in KHANH HOA Province until at least May/June 1968. The VC needed this time to reorganize. Signs of a new offensive would be (1) the movement of troops from the forest to the lowlands, (2) a supplement to Resolution 13, and (3) a meeting between the KHANH HOA Province Committee and NHA TRANG City Committee to plan and forthcoming attacks. The NVA Forces would carry the load of the next offensive since the underground and VC Local Forces had been neutralized by the GVN/US forces. A storage area for food and equipment existed in western KHANH HOA Province for infiltrating NVA Forces.

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NIC REPORT NO : 351/68

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Page 2

1. Source did not feel the Tet offensive would succeed in NHA TRANG City, KHANH HOA Province, because the VC did not have enough strength in arms or men as compared to the GVN/US forces. If a new offensive was launched it would not be for the next three to four months because the VC must reorganize both its underground and operational units. The underground and local force units hardly existed anymore, having been wipe out by the GVN. Because of this, a new general offensive, in all likelihood, would employ strictly NVA troops who had been infiltrating KHANH HOA Province. Prior to mid-1967 the only NVA Regiment in KHANH HOA Province was NVA Regiment 18 composed of 4 units, the 7th, 8th, 9th Battalions and artillery Battery 14. While working for the Propaganda Information Section of the KHANH HOA Province Committee in the production of rice and manioc in late 1967, Source was told by a supervisor (name unknown) that 120 mm mortars had been infiltrated into KHANH HOA Province since mid-1967 and further that all grain would be given to the Rear Service to be stored in western KHANH HOA for the NVA which would infiltrate later.
2. Indications of a future offensive would be:
 - a. The gathering of the NHA TRANG City Committee and the KHANH HOA Provincial Committee to plan the attack. There two groups had met earlier in DONG BO between 15-16 January 1968 to plan the TET offensive.
 - b. A supplementary resolution to Resolution 13, since the latter had not been fulfilled by the TET offensive. The VC had not as Resolution 13 proposed, gained the full support of the people and forced the GVN/US to concede a coalition SVN government.
 - c. Movement of troops from the forests to the lowland areas.

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8

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