## SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

United States Fersion Intelligence Survelliance Court

UNITED STATES

SEP 2 7 2021

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

Clerk of Court

WASHINGTON, D.C.

| Docket Number | Docket Num

# OPINION AND SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

On this date, the Court approved applications for authority to conduct physical search of the above-captioned targets pursuant to Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended (FISA or the Act), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829. These applications propose, for the first time as described below, under FISA authority. By Orders dated February 10 and March 8, 2021, the Court appointed amici curiae with relevant legal expertise pursuant to Section 103(i)(2)(A) to aid in its consideration of these matters. The Court has had the benefit of three rounds of briefing on the legal and technical issues presented by these applications and entertained oral argument on June 24, 2021. The timely and able assistance of amici curiae Marc Zwillinger and James Orenstein is greatly appreciated.

at a particular place. In these applications,

SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA the government seeks physical search authority under FISA to acquire information The application in docket at two separate locations proposes to direct The application pleads the targets of the proposed physical search as non-U.S.-person agents of The application in docket number proposes to direct the This application pleads the targets of the proposed physical search under as agents of


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In FISA parlance, the targets are the individuals or entities about whom or from whom information is sought. *See In re Sealed Case*, 310 F.3d 717, 740 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 73 (1978)).

#### GEORGIA ORGANICIO ANTIGA


The accompanying applications and orders contemplate the government receiving data



-SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA-



any physical intrusion within the United States into premises or property (including examination of the interior of property by technical means) that is intended to result in a seizure, reproduction, inspection, or alteration of information, material, or property, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes ....



SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN/TISA

## SPACE PROPERTY CONTINUES OF THE PROPERTY OF TH

and concluding that this Court "should not lightly dismiss or disregard the willingness of the Executive Branch to submit to this Court's role and authority under FISA").

In addition, the Court has little difficulty finding probable cause to believe that the intended targets of the proposed physical searches are agents of the specified foreign powers on the theories proffered. See 50 U.S.C. § 1824(a)(2)(A).

However, the Court was unable to find, on the basis of the government's original submissions, probable cause to believe that "the premises or property proposed to be searched" in either application "is or is about to be owned, used, possessed by, or is in transit to or from an agent of a foreign power or a foreign power," 50 U.S.C. § 1824(a)(2)(B), without imposing further limits on the proposed production. On the suggestion of Amici, the Court limited the proposed warrants in two significant regards:

proposed warrants in two significant regards:

With

those limitations, the Court was able to find probable cause to believe that the property to be searched is likely to be owned, used, or possessed by an agent of a targeted foreign power.

The government acknowledges, however, that

might not be owned or used by

agents of and undertakes to destroy non-target-related

data as soon as practicable. The Court finds that undertaking too narrow, and requires further

reporting on the implementation of the authority granted in these matters. It is, accordingly,

-SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

# SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

ORDERED that, not later than 60 days after receiving data
the accompanying warrants, the FBI shall destroy any data that the FBI has not affirmatively
determined to be target-related data. The government shall report such destruction to the Court
within ten days of the destruction; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED THAT the search returns filed in this matter shall include copies of the data produced

ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2021, in the docket numbers captioned above.

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

Chief Deputy Clerk, FISC, certify that this document is a true and correct copy of the original.